Malware phylogeny refers to inferring the evolutionary relationships among instances of a family. It plays an important role in malware forensics. Previous works mainly focused on tree-based model. However, trees cannot represent reticulate events, such as inheriting code fragments from different parents, which are common in variants generation. Therefore, phylogenetic networks as a more accurate and general model have been put forward. In this paper, we propose a novel malware phylogenetic network construction method based on splits graph, taking advantage of the one-to-one correspondence between reticulate events and netted components in splits graph. We evaluate our algorithm on three malware families and two benign families whose ground truth are known and compare with competing algorithms. Experiments demonstrate that our method achieves a higher mean accuracy of 64.8%.
Introduction
Malware, short for malicious software, is a pervasive problem of network security. The volume of malware is growing at an exponential pace, it brings severe challenges to security vendors. However, the majority of new incoming instances are tweaked variants of previously encountered malware. They share the same functionality and exhibit characteristics of families.
Phylogeny model inference of malware aims at revealing the evolutionary relationships among families. It is not only helpful to malware classification, but also beneficial to forecast the evolution trend of families and thwart variations in advance. Given a collection of malware instances, phylogeny inference is different from generating a dendrogram based on similarity metric. It focuses on determining the temporal ordering among instances, the ancestor-descendent relationships between them. Besides, malware samples are usually captured in binary form with limited information, which makes phylogeny construction more challenging.
Previous researches of malware phylogeny inference mainly focused on tree-based model [1] - [6] . Karim et al. [1] used the UPGMA algorithm to generate phylogeny trees. Gupta et al. [6] proposed graph pruning techniques to establish phylogeny trees of malcode based on temporal informations. Seideman et al. [2] built phylogeny trees by computing the minimal spanning tree based on distance metric. However, phylogeny trees are not suitable to describe [9] . Jang et al. [7] used the minimal spanning tree to construct phylogeny DAGs of malware. And it added reticulate edges by preprocessing to find nodes with multiple parents. Andreson et al. [8] , [9] employed the Bayesian network discovery algorithm to construct DAGs via statistical inference of conditional dependencies. While it demanded an informative prior about the partial ordering of instances.
In this paper, we propose a novel malware phylogenetic networks construction algorithm based on splits graph, without any prior ordering or post-processing, which refrains us from time consuming manual work and is more suitable for automatic analysis. It is based on the theorem that there exists an one-to-one correspondence between reticulations in network N and netted components of the splits graph S G(N). Therefore, through generating splits graph S G(T 1 , T 2 ) from two phylogeny trees, if netted components occur in S G(T 1 , T 2 ), then we apply splits decomposition to construct phylogenetic networks with reticulations. Otherwise, any of the trees is the representation of family phylogeny. The number of trees can be easily expanded.
We conduct experiments on three malware families and two benign families whose ground truth are known and compare with MKLGC [8] and BNPrior [9] . Results demonstrate that our method performs better in both overall accuracy and precision. It achieves a mean accuracy of 64.8%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the proposed method. Experiments are demonstrated in Sect. 3. Conclusions are given in Sect. 4.
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Proposed Method
Given a collection of variants of a malware family, the phylogenetic network is built on a directed acyclic graph G = (V, E). Each node v in the graph denotes an instance of malware, with one root node without incoming edges. And an edge e = (u, w) denotes u is an ancestor of w and w is a descendant of u. Nodes with two or more than two incoming edges are called "reticulate node".
In this section, we describe our algorithm of constructing phylogenetic networks in detail. We first generate two phylogeny trees T 1 , T 2 by a heuristic algorithm. T 1 is built from the graph edit distance of function-call graphs extracted from programs. And T 2 is built from Euclidean distance of instructions frequency. After that, we construct the splits graph S G(T 1 , T 2 ) of T 1 and T 2 . According to the theorem [10] , if there exists netted components in S G(T 1 , T 2 ), then we employ splits decomposition to find reticulations and construct final networks.
Phylogeny Trees Construction
In this work, we consider a heuristic algorithm to infer directed phylogeny trees. The trees are constructed from two different distance matrixes calculated between instances of a malware family. One of the metrics is the graph edit distance of function call graphs, the other is Euclidean distance of the frequency of instruction mnemonics.
Function Call Graph
Function call graph G = (V, E) is a directed graph extracted from disassembly code of programs. It is a high-level structure feature and represents the functionality of a program. Each vertex in the graph represents a function and each edge represents a caller-callee relationship between functions. Function call graph has the advantage of covering all possible paths a program has. Moreover, it is resilient to low-level obfuscations, such as basic block reordering or register reassignment.
In our work, we use IDA Pro to acquire function call graphs of instances, which has achieved reasonable accuracy. There are two kinds of functions: local functions and external functions. Local functions are those written by program authors and external functions are statically linked or dynamically imported. We take control flow graphs as labels of local functions and function names for external functions. Then we use Hungarian algorithm [11] to calculate the graph edit distance between each pair of instances.
Instruction Frequency
Instruction mnemonics feature is a low-level semantic representation extracted from disassembly binary. Owning to its meaningful semantic characteristics and easy for generating, it is widely used in malware analysis. In our work, we . . , f n ), each f i denotes frequency of a specific instruction. After that, we utilize Euclidean distance to measure the distance between two programs.
where, n denotes the number of instruction kinds comprised in a given malware family, S k denotes the frequency variance of each instruction. Getting the two distance matrixes, we use a heuristic algorithm to infer directed phylogeny trees. Let X denotes the instances set, we maintain an active nodes set S a , which consists of all nodes in current tree T . We first pick the real root node from ground truth being the first active node. At each step, we add a node x from X − S a that satisfy { d min (y, x) | y ∈ S a , x ∈ (X − S a ) } to T , and add a directed edge (y, x). Until S a = X, the process stops.
Splits Graph Construction
For a given set X, a split S = A 1 A 2 is a partition of X into two non-empty and complementary sets and A 1 = X − A 2 . A split is trivial if A 1 or A 2 has only one element. For a tree T , each edge of T defines a split. For example in Fig. 2 
Splits graph S G( ) is representation of a set of splits.
For the two phylogeny trees T 1 and T 2 , let Σ(T 1 ) and Σ(T 2 ) denote the splits of trees, X denotes the collection of instances, Σ denotes the union of Σ(T 1 ) and Σ(T 2 ), S t denotes trivial splits and S n denotes non-trivial splits of Σ. Then S G(T 1 , T 2 ) is constructed as follows:
1. Separate Σ into S t and S n ; 2. For each split S i = x i X−x i in S t , add a node x i and an edge e i pointed to x i in the graph, and create a star graph, as shown in Fig. 2 (i); 3. For each split S j = {x p ,...,x q } X−{x p ,...,x q } belongs to S n , find the shortest path P = (x p , e p , . . . , e q , x q ) from x p to x q in graph. For each node x j along the path except for x p and x q , add a new corresponding node x j and a new edge {x j , x j }. For each edge e j along the path except for e p and e q , add a new corresponding edge e j . Figure 2 ( A 1 B 1 , A 1 B 2 , A 2 B 1 or A 2 B 2 is empty. Given a splits set , compatible relationships of each pair of splits among are described by conflict graph (CG). Each node i in CG denotes a split S i , two nodes i and j are connected in the condition that S i and S j are incompatible. Connected components of CG have one-to-one correspondence with netted componets in splits graph [10] . Therefore, we can find splits contained in each netted component by looking through the corresponding connected component in CG. For example, (T 1 , T 2 ) has only one edge ( {d,e} {a,b,c} , {c,e} {a,b,d} ) in CG, and the corresponding netted component is shown in Fig. 2 (iv) .
If there exists netted components in S G(T 1 , T 2 ), as shown in Fig. 2 (iv) , then for each netted component, we divide X into two subsets R and B, where X denotes nodes contained in the component, R denotes the reticulate nodes and B denotes the backbone nodes, which B = X − R. We consider all possible subsets R of X , from size 1 to |X|. For each choice of R, if the splits of B after eliminating splits of R in the netted component correspond to a tree, the process stops. Then we modify the netted component into representation with backbone tree and reticulate nodes. Finally, the phylogenetic network is constructed.
Experiments
To evaluate the algorithm we proposed, we conduct experiments on five families, of which true phylogenetic graphs are described in [12] . Three of the families are malware: We utilize three metrics to quantify our results, the precision, recall and F-norm. F-norm is an overall metric to measure the error on identified edges. They are defined as follows: precision = true edges in graph the total number o f edges in graph recall = true edges in graph the total number o f edges in ground truth 
where, true edges denote correctly identified edges, A, B denote adjacency matrices of the phylogeny graph we constructed and the ground truth graph. Each element A i j (or B i j ) is either 0 or 1, it denotes whether there exists a directed edge from instance i to instance j. We compare our method with MKLGC proposed in [8] , BN and BNPrior proposed in [9] , which are all the most recent researches of malware phylogeny networks reconstructions. Table 1 shows the results. As the table in bold demonstrates, our algorithm outperforms other algorithms in Fnorm, the overall accuracy of all families. Besides, it has the best precision of all families. For the lower recall than BNPrior, we analysed the reason. Edge directions in the phylogeny networks of malware families are difficult to infer. Parts of wrong identified edges are because of the wrong directions. Therefore, BNPrior with prior information about correct edge directions acquired from human experts attains better recall than ours. However, BNPrior has a number of additional wrong edges, therefore, the precision and overall accuracy of BNPrior are lower than ours.
We found that the distance metrics we used are both symmetric. While in phylogeny tree construction, one mistake may cause a series opposite direction edges because of symmetric distance. Figure 3 shows the phylogenetic graphs of NetworkMiner . Because d(1.3, 1.4) = d(1.4, 1.3) , so the d(1.3, 1.4) < d(1.4, 1. 3) will avoid this mistake, that can effectively increase the recall. In next work, we will take this problem into account. Figure 4 shows the phylogenetic graphs of Mineserver. As the figure shows, we recovered majority edges. While, reticulate edges (20c7, 7120) and (0e29, 05e8) are not recognized. We analysed the two trees of Mineserver, we found that the two trees have the same topology of tuple (20c7, 306b, 7120) and tuple (6bf3, 0e29, 05e8). There are no incompatible splits of two trees in these two tuples. Both function call graph and instruction frequency are static features, through adding dynamic feature trees may improve the performance.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel malware phylogenetic network reconstruction method, taking advantage of the oneto-one correspondence between reticulate events and netted components in splits graph. Our method does not require any prior knowledge about the ordering of instances, which avoids time consuming manual works and makes it more suitable for automatic analysis. Moreover, results demonstrate that our method outperforms other algorithms in both overall accuracy and precision.
